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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-GARNISHMENT
PROCEDURES MUST PROVIDE FOR NOTICE TO POSTJUDGMENT
DEBTOR. Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
Rosemary Davis defaulted on a loan made by Michael Motor
Company, Inc. To collect this debt, Michael Motor Company obtained
a judgment against Davis in Jefferson County Circuit Court. In order
to satisfy the judgment, Marjorie Paschall, the Circuit Clerk, issued a
writ of garnishment and served it on Davis' employer, the Holiday Inn.
Accordingly, Holiday Inn paid approximately $222.00 of wages owed
to Davis into the registry of the Jefferson County Circuit Court as pre-
scribed by the Clerk's order. According to Davis, these payments were
made without notice and without her written consent, denying her an
opportunity to claim exemptions allowable under federal law.'
Davis brought suit in federal district court claiming that the Ar-
kansas garnishment statute2 denied her due process because it permit-
ted a postjudgment taking of her property without notice and opportu-
nity for a hearing concerning potential exemptions. Davis also asserted
that since the Arkansas garnishment statute conflicts with the federal
statute' that prescribes the amount of wages that may be garnished, it
violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.4
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas held that the Arkansas statute violates the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment because it does not require notice to the
judgment debtor informing him or her of the garnishment and any pos-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982) (Restriction on garnishment) provides in pertinent part: "[Tihe
maximum part of the aggregate disposable [after deductions] earnings of an individual for any
workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed (I) 25 per centum of his disposable
earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed
thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage . . . in effect at the time the earnings are payable
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 31-501 to -521 (1962).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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sible state and federal exemptions, or the process by which such exemp-
tions may be claimed. Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark.
1986).
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution' for-
bids states from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the term "due process" to require that before a person is deprived of
property by the state that person must first be given notice and an op-
portunity to present reasons why the property should not be taken.'
The Court has defined the notice component of due process as requiring
that notice be "reasonably calculated" to inform interested parties of
the impending deprivation at a time when they still have an opportu-
nity to present any objections.7 These definitions supplemented the Su-
preme Court's previous discussion of the opportunity to be heard in
Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co.8 In Iron Cliffs the Court held that
a person deprived of property should be afforded an appearance before
an impartial tribunal to contest the claim against him and assert his
rights.9
The United States Supreme Court began to focus on due process
in prejudgment remedies when it decided the landmark case of Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp.10 In Sniadach the Supreme Court addressed
Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment procedures." A creditor brought
suit on a promissory note and before judgment, a writ of garnishment
was served on Sniadach's employer without providing Sniadach with
notice or an opportunity for a hearing. Under Wisconsin law, Snia-
dach's wages were frozen until judgment. 12 The Court held that this
garnishment procedure was unconstitutional because notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing were not afforded to Sniadach.1a The Court ex-
plained its decision to extend due process requirements to the area of
commercial law practices by suggesting that prior due process analo-
gies were outdated and were better applied to feudal times than to
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. Id. at 314.
8. 197 U.S. 463 (1905).
9. Id. at 473.
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
II. Id. at 338.
12. Id. at 338-39. Frozen wages cannot be utilized by the debtor. Id.
13. 395 U.S. 337, 342. For a discussion of this case see Durham, Postjudgment Seizures:
Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing?, 21 S.D.L. REV. 78, 94 (1976).
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modern times. 4 The Court indicated that modern society's dependence
on wages required the Court to address the protection of these wages.' 5
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated, "We deal here with
wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in
our economic system."' 6
Then in Fuentes v. Shevin 7 the United States Supreme Court
seemed to reject a restrictive reading of Sniadach,'8 and applied its due
process requirement to the prejudgment deprivation of consumer
goods.' 9 The Court held that the prejudgment seizure, though allowed
under Florida law, 20 was a denial of due process.2 ' The Court found
significant the fact that the buyer was deprived of the use of the prop-
erty without notice and the opportunity for a hearing.22 This decision
appeared to put the "necessities of life" argument of Sniadach to
rest,23 and established a broadly applicable standard requiring due pro-
cess before deprivation of any property.
Justice White dissented in Fuentes, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun. Justice White insisted that the interests of the
creditor were not given sufficient consideration by the majority.2' He
14. 395 U.S. 337, 340. See also Durham, supra note 13, at 95.
15. 395 U.S. at 340.
16. Id.
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
18. Id. at 85.
19. 407 U.S. at 88-89. A Florida resident purchased consumer goods from a retailer under
an installment sales contract in which the retailer retained a security interest. The buyer ceased
making payments when a dispute arose over a stove that was part of the contract. The seller
brought suit in small claims court and also obtained a writ of replevin under which the sheriff
seized the goods. Id. at 70. See also Durham, supra note 13, at 89.
20. 407 U.S. at 73 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.13 (West Supp. 1972-73)(revised
1973)).
21. 407 U.S. at 96. See also Durham, supra note 13, at 89.
22. Durham, supra note 13, at 89. The creditor in Fuentes argued that the requirements of
posting a bond for double the value of the property and the debtor's right to sue for wrongful
attachment gave the debtor adequate protection. But the Court stated that these "protections"
missed the point. 407 U.S. at 83.
23. No doubt, there may be many graduations in the 'importance' or 'necessity' of vari-
ous consumer goods. Stoves could be compared to television sets, or beds could be com-
pared to tables. But if the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with
objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of
.property' generally. And, under our free-enterprise system, an indivudual's choices in
the market place are respected, however unwise they may seem to someone else. It is
not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own critical
evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are
.necessary.'
407 U.S. at 89-90.
24. 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
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suggested a more cautious balancing of the interests of the parties
(creditor and debtor).2 5 White's dissent is significant because it pro-
vided the basis for the Court's decision two years later in Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant Co. 2 6
Mitchell was the third prejudgment case the Supreme Court
heard. Justice White wrote the majority opinion, in which the Court
applied a type of balancing test27 and found that the Louisiana prop-
erty seizure procedure28 effected a constitutional accomodation of the
conflicting interests of the creditor and debtor .2  The Court found that
the statute protected the creditor's rights by guarding against the dan-
ger of destruction or alienation of property, while protecting the
debtor's rights with the possibility of damages and attorney's fees if the
grounds for the creditor's writ should fail.30 Thus, the Court found that
the Louisiana procedure did not violate the due process provision of the
fourteenth amendment, even though no notice or opportunity for a
hearing was provided prior to deprivation of property.-"
In its next case on prejudgment seizures, North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,32 the Supreme Court relied largely on Fuentes to
invalidate a Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute. 33 The Court,
holding that the Georgia statute violated the fourteenth amendment,
again rejected a strict interpretation of due process requirements and
refused to distinguish among different kinds of property. 4 So, at that
25. Id. "I would not ignore, as the Court does, the creditor's interest in preventing further
use and deterioration of the property in which he has substantial interest." Id.
26. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See also Note, Due Process, Postjudgment Garnishment, and
"Brutal Need" Exemptions, 1982 DUKE L.J. 192, 197 (1982).
27. 416 U.S. at 618. See also Durham, supra note 13, at 91.
28. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
29. 416 U.S. at 610. The four dissenters in Mitchell constituted the majority in Fuentes, and
the two new members on the Court (Justices Powell and Rehnquist) combined with the Fuentes
dissenters to constitute a majority in Mitchell. Durham, supra note 13, at 91.
30. 416 U.S. at 606-07.
31. 416 U.S. at 610. This analysis was in accord with Justice White's dissent in Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
32. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
33. Id. at 606. The statute in question permitted garnishment of a bank account through a
writ issued by a court clerk without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without partici-
pation by a judicial officer. Id. at 601-03.
34. It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely suffer
irreparably than corporations deprived of bank account, but the probability of irrepara-
ble injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to
guard against the risk of initial error. We are no more inclined now than we have been
in the past to distinguish among different kinds of property in applying the Due Process
Clause.
Id. at 608; see also Logue, supra note 26, at 198.
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point, the lineage of the prejudgment cases gave no clear standard by
which to judge the due process requirements of prejudgment sum-
mary-seizure procedures."5 Justice Blackmun summarized the con-
fused state of the law:
The Court once again-for the third time in less than three
years-struggles with what it regards as the due process aspects of a
state's old and long-unattacked commercial statutes designed to afford
a way for relief to a creditor against a delinquent debtor. . . . And,
as a result, the corresponding commercial statutes of all other states
. . . are left in questionable constitutional status, with little or no ap-
plicable standard by which to measure and determine their validity
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The Supreme Court attempted to provide something akin to a
standard for the requirements of predetermination due process in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge.3 7 The Court in Mathews noted the lack of an identi-
fiable, cohesive rule emerging from Sniadach, Fuentes, and North
Georgia Finishinge8 and offered the first complete formulation of the
due process balancing test: 9
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dic-
tates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.40
Although Mathews provided no support for the constitutionality of
(prejudgment) execution statutes, it suggested minimum procedures
35. Note, supra note 26, at 198. The two approaches applied by the court were: (a) Fuentes'
categorical insistence on a hearing prior to any deprivation; and (2) Mitchell's balancing of inter-
ests to determine whether an adequate "constitutional accommmodation" between the conflicting
interests of the parties had been reached. Id.
36. 419 U.S. at 614 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Here prejudgment due process was presented in a different context
than in the previous debtor/creditor cases. Eldridge challenged the constitutionality of an adminis-
trative procedure established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for assessing
the existence of a continuing disability and thus determining the continuance or discontinuance of
disability payments.
38. See id. at 333-34.
39. Note, supra note 26, at 199.
40. 424 U.S. at 334-35.
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necessary to satisfy due process 4I and suggested a resolution of the con-
fusion surrounding the prejudgment seizure cases."2 The Mathews for-
mulation could be viewed as a generalization of the concerns indicated
in Justice White's prejudgment seizure opinions, affirming that due
process involves a balancing test that can require different procedural
safeguards when different interests are at stake. 3 Additionally, the test
emphasized that the type of property at stake is a primary considera-
tion in determining the required procedural safeguards." In Mathews
the Court relied heavily on the type of property at stake, disability ben-
efits, to determine the necessary procedural protection."5 Application of
the Mathews balancing test seemed to provide courts with a standard
to determine whether notice and a hearing are required before a tem-
porary deprivation. Courts would first examine the nature of the prop-
erty interest in question, and then determine to what extent procedural
safeguards would suffice in preventing erroneous deprivations from oc-
curring.46 The weight given to each side of the balance remains
unclear.'
Postjudgment due process was first addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in 1924 in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia
Press, Inc.4a In Endicott, the Court reviewed a New York postjudg-
ment garnishment procedure 49 and found that the procedure was con-
stitutional, although it did not provide for notice or opportunity for a
41. Id. at 348-49. As noted above, the case did not involve a prejudgment procedure. Upon
examination of the procedure for terminating disability payments under the Social Security Act,
the Court found that, before termination, the agency must inform the recipient of its tentative
decision and provide him with a summary of the evidence upon which the decision was based and
permit him to review the evidence in his file and to respond to the proposed decision with addi-
tional evidence. The Court found that these procedures satisfied its due process test and that a full
evidentiary hearing was not required. See also Greenfield, A Constitutional Limitation on the
Enforcement of Judgment-Due Process and Exemptions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 877, 918 (1976).
42. Note, supra note 26, at 200.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 424 U.S. at 340-41. The Court distinguished an earlier case, Goldberg. v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), which required an evidentiary hearing before a temporary deprivation of welfare as-
sistance. The Court in Mathews found that the hearing in Goldberg was required because welfare
assistance was the "type" of property given to persons on the very margin of subsistence. Note,
supra note 26, n.58, at 200.
46. Note, supra note 26, at 201.
47. See Greenfield, supra note 41, at 918-23.
48. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
49. Id. at 286-87, where the Court discusses N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW, § 1391. That statute
provided that if a judgment had been obtained and an execution returned unsatisfied, a judge or
justice could order an execution or garnishment be issued against the debtor's wages without no-
tice to the judgment debtor.
[Vol. 9:517
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hearing to the debtor before taking the property."0 The Court stated
that if notice were given to the judgment debtor before issuing the gar-
nishment, the purpose of the writ could be frustrated since the property
in question could be disposed of before service could be had.51 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that notice to the debtor was not necessary in a
postjudgment proceeding. 52
Because of the severity and risk of erroneous deprivation resulting
from this rule, lower courts in recent years have refused to apply En-
dicott in postjudgment cases and have instead relied on comparisons to
the balancing tests applied in the prejudgment cases.8 3 Although the
Supreme Court has not overruled Endicott,54 there is some support to
view it as representing an outdated due process analysis,55 especially
since Endicott did not consider the possibility that the judgment debtor
might be deprived of exempt property. 56 A series of recent postjudg-
ment cases have succeeded in distinguishing Endicott, and have instead
looked to the prejudgment cases as authority. The first case in this se-
ries is Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp.57 In Brown the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a Florida postjudgment wage-garnish-
ment statute58 that did not provide notice, opportunity for a hearing, or
any other safeguard to prevent erroneous deprivation of property. 9 The
court applied a balancing test similar to the one stated in Mathews and
held that the Florida postjudgment garnishment statute satisfied due
process requirements.60 The court addressed the risk of erroneous dep-
50. Id. at 288.
[Olur system of jurisprudence [does] not require that a defendant who has been
granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in court, should, after a judg-
ment has been rendered against him, have a further notice and hearing before supple-
mental proceedings are taken to reach his property in satisfaction of the judgment.
Id.
51. Id. at 290.
52. Id. at 288.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 57-90.
54. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to two cases challenging the holding in Endicott,
but both times it subsequently refused to hear the case. Moya v. De Baca, 395 U.S, 825 (1969)
(motion to dismiss granted); Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968) (certiorari dismissed as
improvidently granted). For further discussion, see Note, A Due Process Analysis of New York's
Postjudgment Garnishment Procedure, 44 AMa. L. REV. 849 (1980).
55. Greenfield, supra note 41, at 886. Four justices dissented from the dismissal of the writ
in Hanner v. DeMarcus (an Arizona postjudgment case); three of them suggesting that Endicott
should be overruled. Id. at 886 n.50 (citing Hanner. 390 U.S. 736, 740-42 (1968)).
56. Greenfield, supra note 41, at 887.
57. 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977).
58. 539 F.2d at 1362 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 77.01, 77.03 (West Supp. 1975-76)).
59. 539 F.2d at 1365. For discussion, see supra note 26, at 202.
60. 539 F.2d at 1368.
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rivation, part of the Mathews test, and observed that an additional re-
quirement of a sworn, judicially reviewed affidavit by the creditor that
the property to be seized is not exempt, "might reduce the incidence of
wrongful garnishment ... ."61 However, the court in Brown did not
find that the creditor's testimony was necessary to satisfy due process
requirements because the risk of erroneous deprivation had a smaller
significance with respect to the Florida postjudgment garnishment pro-
visions than it had in Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing.62 Though
the court in Brown upheld the constitutionality of the Florida statute, it
is an important decision in that it applied the due process test of the
prejudgment cases.63
Relying on Brown, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in Finberg v. Sullivan,6" reviewed an action brought by a
social security recipient challenging the constitutionality of Pennsylva-
nia's postjudgment garnishment statute." The court in Finberg focused
its inquiry on the two primary considerations of the Mathews test: the
effect of due process requirements on the private parties, and the risk
of erroneous deprivation." Applying this balancing test, the court con-
sidered both the heightened interest of the creditor in the postjudgment
situation and Mrs. Finberg's interest in uninterrupted access to the
bank account containing her social security benefits.67 The court found
this to be a significant "type" of property.68 The Third Circuit distin-
61. Id. at 1369.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court in Brown discussed Endicott but chose to rely on the more recent prejudg-
ment cases. "More recent decisions to the Supreme Court establish the need to balance various
interest in order to determine whether due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing whenever an individual is to be deprived of property permanently or temporarily." Id. at 1364.
64. 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (garnishment of a bank account).
65. Id. at 59. The statute permitted a creditor to take 15 days to respond to a petition to set
aside a garnishment and did not provide a hearing on the issue.
66. Id. at 58. See also Note, supra note 16, at 201.
67. 634 F.2d at 58.
The attachment of property held by a garnishee is, like a prejudgment seizure, a provi-
sional measure serving the judgment creditor's interests by preventing transfer or con-
cealment of the property before the creditor can execute a final seizure. The attachment
affects the debtor's interest by depriving her of the continued use of her property.
Id. at 57-58.
68. Id. at 58.
A bank account may well contain the money that a person needs for food, shelter,
health care, and other basic requirements of life . . . .Additional income from a future
paycheck, welfare benefit, or other sources may not be available for two weeks or more,
and that income may be insufficient to meet the person's immediate needs.
[Vol. 9:517
GARNISHMENT PROCEDURE
guished Endicott as not addressing the issue of exempt property,69 and
concluded that the Pennsylvania procedure failed to provide a "fair ac-
commodation of the respective interests of creditor and debtor," failing
the due process balancing test set forth in Mathews. 0 The court in
Finberg imposed due process requirements of a prompt postseizure
hearing 7' and notice that would inform the debtor of possible exemp-
tions.71 The court emphasized the importance of safeguarding against
erroneous deprivation, but refused to adopt the safeguards suggested by
Mitchell.73 The court stated that such safeguards may be desirable, but
were not required to satisfy due process requirements. 74
The third case in the recent series of cases distinguishing Endicott
is Betts v. Tom, 7  decided by the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii. In Betts the court found that the Hawaiian
postjudgment garnishment procedure 76 denied debtors due process of
law.7 7 The court reviewed the postjudgment garnishment procedure
that allowed a creditor to garnish a bank account containing welfare
benefits and held that due process required a garnishment procedure to
include preventative safeguards. 7a The court in Betts expressly adopted
and applied the Mathews test. 9 Applying the test, the court found that
the Hawaii statutory scheme presented too great a risk that welfare
recipients would be erroneously deprived of needed benefits,80 and thus
held that safeguards similar to those upheld in Mitchell should be in-
cluded in Hawaii's statutory scheme. 81 The holding considered and bal-
69. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) provides for the exemption of Social Security benefits which
were the object of garnishment in Finberg. The exemption of social security benefits continues
when the benefits are held in bank accounts just as when originally issued to the recipient. Phil-
pott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 416 (1973).
70. 634 F.2d at 58-62. For further discussion see Note, supra note 26, at 201.
71. 634 F.2d at 61.
72. Id. at 61-62.
73. Id. The safeguards suggested in Mitchell were: An affidavit from the creditor that ex-
empt goods would not be attached; or requiring the posting of a creditor bond to compensate the
debtor for wrongful seizure; or mandating that only a judge or magistrate issue the writ of execu-
tion. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
74. Id. at 62.
75. 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Hawaii 1977).
76. Id. at 1370 (citing HAWAII REV. STAT. § 652-1(b) (Supp. 1979))(amending 1979). This
statute contained no requirement that the debtor be notified of the garnishment.
77. 431 F. Supp. at 1378.
78. Id. at 1378. For further discussion see Note, supra note 26, at 201.
79. 431 F. Supp. at 1375. For further discussion see Note, supra note 26, at 204.
80. 431 F. Supp. at 1377-78. For further discussion see Note, supra note 26, at 204-05.
81. Id. at 1377-78. (1) an affidavit, supported by facts, stating that the assets garnished are
not within the welfare exemption; (2) review of the affidavit by a judicial officer; and (3) prompt
postdeprivation notice and hearing within two days on the exemption claim. Note the similarily to
1986-87]
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anced the most important interests of both the creditor and the
debtor. 82 The Betts procedures protected the debtor by providing a
prompt postdeprivation hearing, as in Finberg and Brown, and provided
the additional safeguard of requiring the creditor to file a factual affi-
davit to be reviewed by a judge. 83 The court distinguished Endicott as
not dealing with a judgment debtor's right to exemption.84
Finally, a postjudgment case decided in 1984, Dionne v. Bouley,8 5
clearly rejected Endicott and stated that it was inapplicable to cases
involving potentially exempt wages. 86 Dionne involved the postjudgment
attachment of social security benefits, and the district court held that
Rhode Island's statutory postjudgment scheme87 violated the due pro-
cess clause. 88 The court of appeals stated that the expansive language
in Endicott was no longer law, given the recent precedent addressing
property seizure by creditors and the due process requirements of
preventing erroneous deprivation.89 The court applied the Mathews bal-
ancing test and required that a judgment debtor be timely notified of
an opportunity to challenge any deprivation of his or her exempt prop-
erty, because an unlawful attachment of the debtor's exempt property
affects the debtor's rights in a way that the judgment does not.90
When the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas decided Davis v. Paschall,91 it was faced with this line of
the Mitchell safeguards, supra note 73. See also Note, supra note 26, at 204-05.
82. 431 F. Supp. at 1378. For further discussion see Note, supra note 26, at 205.
The serious hardship on the AFDC recipient would be minimized since an erroneous
freezing of funds could only occur for a brief period. The affidavit requirement will help
protect the judgment debtor by forcing the creditor to consider the possibility of an
AFDC exemption. In addition, by allowing a short ex parte seizure this procedure
would protect the judgment creditor from being deprived of garnishable assets by those
debtors who would immediately dispose of their funds in contemplation of execution.
431 F. Supp. at 1378.
83. Note, supra note 26, at 206.
84. 431 F. Supp. at 1374. See also Neeley v. Century Fin. Co. of Arizona, 606 F. Supp.
1453, 1461 (D.C. Ariz. 1985) when the court stated, "This court considers the Endicott-Johnson
holding as not being applicable in those situations where a specific statute, either state or federal,
precludes certain assets from being subjected to liability for a person's debts." Deary v. Guardian
Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that reliance on Endicott is
misplaced).
85. 583 F. Supp. 307 (D.R.I. 1984), afd as modified, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985).
86. 583 F. Supp. at 314-15, 757 F.2d 1351-52.
87. R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 §§ 9-25-12, 9-28-1, 10-5-2 (1956); District Court Civil Rule
46)(2).
88. 583 F. Supp. at 318-19 (D.R.I. 1984).
89. 757 F.2d at 1351-52.
90. Id. at 1352.
91. 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
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postjudgment cases that seemed to be abandoning the Endicott reason-
ing and moving toward some version of Mathews. Some cases have
continued to follow the logic of the fifty-year-old Endicott decision 92
without expressly referring to it, while others, those previously dis-
cussed, have chosen to use the balancing test of Mathews that was em-
ployed in the prejudgment cases. In Davis v. Paschall the court noted
that Endicott seemed to settle the question of whether a postjudgment
debtor was entitled to notice and a hearing to claim exemptions, by not
requiring either of these and by stating that the debtor had already had
his day in court.93 But then the court in Davis went on to note that the
analysis of due process in debtor-creditor cases had changed as a result
of cases such as Mitchell, Fuentes, Sniadach, and North Georgia Fin-
ishing.94 The court noted the Supreme Court's decisions in those four
cases and the Supreme Court's determination that a prejudgment pro-
cedure for seizure of an asset could be held constitutional only if it
provided adequate safeguards to limit the occurrence of erroneous dep-
rivations and allow the debtor to correct such error in a timely man-
ner.93 To support this proposition the court discussed Mathews and
viewed it as the Supreme Court's changing analysis of due process.96
The court quoted the Mathews balancing test and then noted that re-
cent postjudgment garnishment cases had begun to utilize the same
balancing of interests the Supreme Court had set out in Mathews.9
The court in Davis observed that in Finberg, the Third Circuit had
considered both the creditor's and debtor's interest in the garnishment
procedure and required a prompt hearing for claiming exemptions.
Then, relying on Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,98 the
court in Finberg found that notice of the attempted garnishment should
inform the judgment debtor of statutory exemptions.99
The court also noted a number of cases following Finberg, but was
particularly persuaded by Dionne v. Bouley,100 and adopted its holding
that a state statute was unconstitutional because it did not require no-
92. See Credit Serv. Co. v. Linnerooth, 290 Minn. 256, 187 N.W.2d 632 (1971); Bittner v.
Butts, 514 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1974).
93. 640 F. Supp. at 200.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 201.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 201 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (a
shut-off notice denied due process because the notice did not explain the method for contesting
termination)).
99. 640 F. Supp. at 201 (citing Finberg, 634 F.2d 50).
100. 583 F. Supp. 307.
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tice and a prompt hearing after garnishment of a judgment debtor. 0 1
The court in Davis agreed with Mathews and Brown that due process
does not require notice or a hearing before a postjudgment attachment,
but that once the attachment is made, the debtor must be notified and
given an opportunity to claim any exemptions.' In support of this the-
ory, the court in Davis relied on an Arkansas prejudgment decision,
G.A.C. Trans-world Acceptance Corporation v. Jaynes Enterprises, in
which the Arkansas Supreme Court held the Arkansas prejudgment
garnishment procedures unconstitutional.' 0 '
Upon review of the Arkansas procedure pertaining to postjudg-
ment garnishment,' 0" the court in Davis found that the statutes do not
require notice to the judgment debtor informing him of the garnish-
ment, exemptions, or a hearing to claim such exemptions. 0 5 The court
relied on language in Dionne stating that "an unlawful attachment of
the debtor's exempt property affects the debtor's rights in a way in
which the judgment does not."'' 0 Since the Arkansas procedure re-
quired no notice or hearing upon postjudgment seizure, the debtor's
right to claim exemptions was not protected. Accordingly, the court
applied the holding of Dionne and concluded that the Arkansas statutes
do not contain sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous
seizures.10 7 The court in Davis held that this omission of safeguards
violated due process and rendered the Arkansas postjudgment garnish-
ment procedures unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 0 8
The practical effect of this decision was to cease all garnishment in
the State of Arkansas. This had a discernible negative impact on credi-
tors who have an interest in expedient recovery against a judgment
debtor. Garnishment is often the only means by which a creditor can
collect his or her judgment from the debtor. In response to this interest,
Judge Overton, who wrote the opinion in Davis, issued an Amended
101. 640 F. Supp. at 201.
102. Id. at 202 (citing Dionne, 583 F. Supp. 307, affid as modified, 757 F.2d 1344).
103. Id. (citing G.A.C. Trans-World Acceptance Corp. v. Jaynes Enters., 255 Ark. 752, 502
S.W.2d 651 (1973)). The court noted that the Arkansas statutory procedure for garnishment both
before and after judgment is set forth in ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-501 to -521 (1962) and that the
Arkansas Supreme Court has held the procedure unconstitutional and void as it permitted pre-
judgment garnishment without notice and a hearing. 640 F. Supp. at 202.
104. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-207 (1962) (wages) and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-209 (1962) (con-
stitutional exemptions).
105. 640 F. Supp. at 202-03.
106. Id. at 202.




Consent Judgment. Judge Overton carefully noted that courts ordina-
rily do not propose or write legislation in actions for declaratory judg-
ment to have a statute declared unconstitutional, and that legislative
concerns should be resolved by the General Assembly. But here, he
said, all the parties to this action agreed upon a procedure, and the
garnishment statute did not prevent implementation of the due process
requirements proposed by the parties. Thus, in the Amended Consent
Judgment, Judge Overton articulated a procedure for issuing writs of
garnishment that meets minimum standards of due process of law.
It is interesting to note that the amended order specifically ad-
dressed only procedures to be followed in Jefferson County Circuit
Court, but there appeared to be agreement that the procedure should
be instituted in other counties.
As a result of Davis, the Arkansas General Assembly will have to
enact new legislation to bring Arkansas' garnishment statutes into com-
pliance with the district court's ruling on the constitutional require-
ments of due process. The Arkansas Bar Association has drafted a
model garnishment statute, and a revised statute was considered by the
1987 Arkansas General Assembly.10 9 The proposed legislation, in an
attempt to comply with Judge Overton's order, specifically delineates
the contents of the writ of garnishment, requiring that the writ state
the specific dollar amounts claimed, the time period in which the gar-
nishee may file an answer to the writ, and the consequence of garnish-
ment by default if the garnishee fails to answer.
Also proposed is a section that would require that the garnishee be
informed of possible exempt property or earnings and of nonexempt
earnings that are subject to garnishment. The drafted legislation in-
cludes sections requiring notice to the judgment debtor and defines
what the notice must entail. In the suggested procedure, a judgment
debtor would be informed of his right to file a written objection or
claim of exemption and the opportunity for a hearing on such a claim.
The provisions described seemed to be mandated by the Davis decision.
This type of legislation is intended to protect the interests of both
the creditor and debtor. The creditor is allowed to garnish as long as he
or she informs the debtor of the ramifications of a writ of garnishment
and the process for contesting. The debtor is allowed an opportunity to
contest any seizure of property and/or wage. The desired result is to
minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation of property while affording
creditors the right to satisfy judgments.
109. H.B. 1829, 76th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., 1987 Arkansas.
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The Davis decision may also have repercussions for Arkansas' exe-
cution statutes. 1 ° Currently in Arkansas, an execution may issue upon
any final judgment."' Though the statutes provide for a number of
property exemptions,' 12 and an opportunity for a hearing to claim such
exemptions, 13 they do not require that notice be given to the debtor
upon issuing the writ of execution. The Arkansas General Assembly
may also have to address the issue of notice to avoid a due process
challenge similar to that of Davis.
Kathleen A. Hillegas
110. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-101 to -313.
III. Id. at § 30-101.
112. Id. at §§ 30-201 to -220.
113. Id. at § 30-209.
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